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LABOR RELATIONS-Consumer Picketing Under 
Section 8(h) (4) (ii) (B) of the National 
Labor Relations Act-Honolulu Typographical 
Union, No. 37, 1.T.U., A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. NLRB* 
[Vol. 67 
When a dispute arose between a local of the International 
Typographical Union and a Honolulu newspaper, the union pro-
.ceeded to picket several restaurants which advertised in that news-
paper. The pickets carried signs and distributed handbills identifying 
the dispute and asking potential consumers of the restaurants not 
"to purchase ... products advertised in the struck [newspaper]."1 
However, since the restaurants did not advertise individual products 
but claimed generally that they were good places to eat, the pickets' 
appeal was, in effect, a request to the public to avoid patronizing 
those restaurants. The picketed restaurants subsequently instituted 
proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board claiming 
that the picketing should be prohibited because it was a secondary 
boycott which violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).2 The union argued that its actions con-
• 401 F. 2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968) [hereinafter principal case]. 
1. Principal.case at 954. 
2. 29 U.S.C. § I58(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1964). This section provides in part: 
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) ••• (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce 
or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or 
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person • • • 
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stituted consumer picketing and that therefore they were protected 
under the United States Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. 
Fruit & Vegetable Packers Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits).3 
The Board found that the picketing was a violation of the NLRA 
and issued a cease and desist order against further picketing by the 
union. The union appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia upheld the NLRB's finding and granted its 
cross-petition for enforcement of the cease and desist order. The 
court stated that the pickets' request was aimed at the restaurants' 
business in general and not at a specific product;4 thus, the picketing 
was not protected by the Tree Fruits doctrine and was an illegal 
secondary boycott.15 
The principal case is concerned generally with the problem of 
secondary activity by unions, and specifically with the application of 
a judicially created exception to the general prohibition against 
such activity. As originally written, section 8(b)(4) was intended to 
protect neutral employers from becoming involved in disputes be-
tween other employers and unions by prohibiting certain union 
activities.6 Among the practices forbidden was the traditional sec-
ondary boycott which arises when a union in a dispute with a 
primary employer brings pressure to bear on other employers (sec-
ondary employers), through their employees, to cease doing business 
with the primary.7 However, the statute did not seek to insulate the 
primary employer from this indirect pressure; rather, "the gravamen 
of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the 
employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third 
party who has no concern in it."8 In short, Congress intended to 
prevent those who were only tangentially related from becoming in-
volved . 
• • • [N]othing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, 
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including 
customers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are 
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute 
and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have 
an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the 
primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, 
or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the employer engaged in 
such distribution •••• 
3. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). See text accompanying notes 13-15 infra. 
4. Principal case at 954. 
5. Principal case at 957. 
6. As added by section 303(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 
§ 303(a), 61 Stat., 158 (1947), section 8(b)(4) forbade a union to induce "employees of 
any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their 
employment." For a discussion of the shortcomings of this approach to the problem 
of protecting neutral employers against secondary pressures by unions, see Aaron, 
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1086, 
1112-13 (1960). 
7. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 6. 
8. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d 
Cir. 1950) Gudge Learned Hand). 
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The language of the original section 8(b)(4) prohibited unions 
only from inducing "the employees" of a secondary employer.0 This 
construction proved far too narrow, and in 1959, Congress sought 
to expand the scope of prohibited secondary activity by enacting 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). This new provision makes it an unfair labor 
practice for a union "to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person 
engaged in commerce" if its objective is to force him to stop doing 
business with "any other person."10 Obviously, this prohibitory 
language is very broad, but Congress did make a specific exception 
for truthful publicity, communicated by means other than picketing, 
designed to inform the public that a product of the primary em-
ployer is being distributed by secondary employers.11 According to 
many commentators, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), when viewed in light 
of this proviso, is intended to operate as a complete ban on consumer 
picketing.12 In their view, any attempt by the union to pressure a 
secondary employer by inducing his customers to stop doing busi-
ness with him is illegal secondary activity under the NLRA. The 
effect of such secondary pressure is certainly similar to a union at-
tempt to influence the primary by appealing to the secondary's work 
force. In both cases, the neutral employer is forced into a dispute 
which does not directly concern him. 
Five years after the 1959 amendments, in Tree Fruits,13 the 
Supreme Court declared that the ostensibly comprehensive prohibi-
tions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) do not forbid all consumer picketing. 
In that case, the union's dispute was with a producer of apples, 
but it chose to picket a retail supermarket which sold the apples as 
one of many items. The picketing was not specifically aimed at the 
retailer; it clearly identified the primary employer-the producer 
-as the union's target and asked only that the consumers refrain 
from purchasing his apples. The Court held that peaceful secondary 
picketing of retail stores was not prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 
when its sole purpose was to ask consumers not to buy the primary 
employer's product.14 The Court found that Congress intended to 
9. See note 6 supra. 
~ IO. NLRA, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1964). This section is repro• 
duced in note 2 supra. See note Zl infra. 
11. Id. 
12. E.g., Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield of 
Tree Fruits, 49 MINN. L. R.Ev. 479, 481 n.6 (1965). See also Cox, The Landrum-Griffin 
Amendments to the NL.R.A., 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 274 1959; Aaron, supra note 6, 
at 1114-15. 
13. NLRB v. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 
(1964). 
14. 377 U.S. at 71. It would appear necessary to come within the standard estab• 
lished that the picket signs clearly identify the primary employer (both who he is and 
that he is the target) and ask only that consumers not buy his product. Such a test 
very closely approximates the language of the proviso to section 8(b)(4), which 
states that the union does not commit an unlawful secondary boycott if its actions 
amount only to "truthfully advising the public ..• that a product or products are 
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distinguish picketing which merely follows the struck product and 
attempts to persuade consumers not to buy it from picketing which is 
aimed at preventing all trade with the secondary employer. The 
majority opinion stated: 
When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers 
not to buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely con-
fined to the primary dispute. . .. On the other hand, when con-
sumer picketing is employed to persuade customers not to trade 
at all with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck 
product, not because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure 
designed to inflict injury on his business generally. In such a case, 
the union does more than merely follow the struck product; it 
creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer.115 
In the Court's view, then, only that picketing aimed at preventing 
all trade with the secondary corresponds to the traditional secondary 
boycott proscribed by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 
Despite the Court's rationale in Tree Fruits, the decision is diffi-
cult to support as a matter of strict statutory interpretation; section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and its proviso seem to indicate that all consumer 
picketing is illegal.16 In fact, the NLRB's opinion in Tree Fruits 
states that " 'by the literal wording of the proviso . . . as well as 
through the interpretative gloss placed thereon by its drafters, con-
sumer picketing in front of a secondary establishment is pro-
hibited.' "17 Thus, the Board held that the picketing in question was 
illegal. The Board's holding, then, as well as the views of some com-
mentators,18 indicates that Tree Fruits must be regarded as a ju-
dicially created exception to the general rule against consumer 
picketing. Consequently, the decision should be narrowly construed 
to assure the continuing validity of the general rule. 
The Tree Fruits case distinguished between picketing one of 
many products handled by a secondary-a partial boycott-and an 
attempt to prevent all trade with the secondary-a total boycott. This 
test is difficult to apply in factual contexts that differ from the situa-
tion in Tree Fruits. For instance, when the struck product encom-
passes all or a substantial part of the secondary's business ("one 
product" cases),19 consumer picketing of the primary's product at the 
secondary's place of business may well produce the same pressures on 
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute 
and are distributed by another employer [as long as there are no effects on employees 
of anyone other than the primary in the course of their employment]." 
15. 377 U.S. at 72. 
16. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
17. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 132 N.L.R.B. II72, II77 (1961). 
18. See note 6 supra. 
19. That is, if he sells only one particular brand of gasoline or one type of car. 
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the secondary as would the traditional secondary boycott which 
section 8(b)(4) proscribes.20 
The principal case presents a somewhat related problem. The 
picketed restaurants did not advertise a specific product in the 
struck newspaper; rather, they claimed that they were good places 
to eat. Picketing the advertised product, therefore, necessarily af-
fected the secondary's entire business.21 The court applied the Tree 
Fruits doctrine and found the total-partial boycott distinction to be 
crucial. Picketing, the court stated, is permissible when only a small 
part of the secondary's business is affected (as in Tree Fruits), but 
impermissible when the "picketing appeal to consumers is expanded 
to request a total boycott of the secondary seller . : .. "22 In the latter 
situation, found to exist in the principal case, the picketing is illegal 
under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 
Although this conclusion is consistent with the Tree Fruits ra-
tionale, it ignores the conceptual problems involved with extending 
that rationale to cases in which intangible services rather than 
products are furnished by the primary. It is suggested that these con-
ceptual problems might be solved by dividing consumer picketing 
situations into two basic types which could be called "chain" and 
"merger." Tree Fruits and the "one product" situations23 are ex-
amples of chain cases.24 The struck product of the primary passes to 
the retailer-secondary (perhaps through middlemen) unchanged. 
Consequently, it is relatively easy to visualize the product in ques-
tion as that of the primary, although it is ultimately picketed at the 
secondary's place of business. The problem with chain cases then 
becomes one of deciding what portion of the secondary's business 
must be involved in order to make the picketing a violation unde1 
the Tree Fruits distinction between total and partial boycotts. 
This question, although vital for an effective application of the 
test, has not yet been answered by the Supreme Court. 
Cases like the principal case, however, do not fit this chain con-
20. The court in the principal case expressly reserved opinion on the "one 
product" case. Principal case at 956 n.9. The Tree Fruits decision did not spe-
cifically discuss "one product" cases either. However, the effect in such a case of 
consumer picketing appears to be indistinguishable from the effect in the principal 
case. Both fact situations appear closely analogous to a total boycott of the secondary, 
which, under Tree Fruits, would be illegal. 
21. The court in the principal case stated: 
[T]he picketing appeal to consumers not to buy "products advertised in the 
struck ••• [p]ress" was an attempt to cling to a legal concept evolved for another 
case even though the language patently does not fit the facts of this situation. 
The only realistic meaning of the appeal is the traditional "do not patronize this 
establishment. 
Principal case at 954. 
22. Principal case at 955. 
23. See text accompanying note 20 supra. 
24. There may be other chain cases involving more than one product picketed, but 
the analysis would be the same. 
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cept, because the product of the primary (intangible services) is not 
simply passed along to and sold by the secondary in the same form. 
The picketing, therefore, is not directed at the particular service 
in question-in the principal case the newspaper advertising-but 
at the products ultimately produced and sold by the secondary. 
In order to visualize the primary's product as the one being picketed, 
resort must be made to a concept such as merger. In the principal 
case, for instance, since advertising costs contribute to the cost of 
the secondary's product and ultimately to the price a diner pays for 
his meal, the advertising might be thought of as "merged" into the 
secondary's product.25 The unions would undoubtedly argue that 
this merger of the primary's product into the secondary's is sufficient 
to identify the two so as to justify consumer picketing of the 
secondary's product. It is submitted, however, that such an argument 
should be rejected. Since the product of the secondary in merger 
cases is substantially different from that of the primary, permitting 
consumer picketing of the secondary's product does not accord with 
the Tree Fruits rationale. In these situations the union's appeal 
cannot be said to be "closely confined to the primary dispute." It 
also seems that this type of picketing "create[s] a separate dispute 
with the secondary employer."20 Moreover, in merger cases, since 
picketing the primary's contribution means picketing the entire 
product sold by the secondary, the appeal of the pickets is aimed 
directly at the secondary's total business. Therefore, the picketing 
becomes, in effect, a total boycott of the secondary which, under 
Tree Fruits, clearly violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). At least one recent 
Board decision is in accord with this analysis.27 
25. Examples of "merger" cases, in addition to the advertising situation, would be 
cases in which the primary provided some intangible service or component part that 
contributed to what the secondary ultimately sold to his customers. For an example of 
an intangible service other than advertising, see Laundry, Dry Cleaning &: Dye House 
Workers International Union, Local 259, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,i 21,328. See also 
note 27 infra. 
An example of a component parts type of merger case is Twin City Carpenters 
District Council &: Boot &: Shoe Workers Union, Local 527-C, AFL-CIO, 167 N.L.R.B. 
No. 51, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ,i 21,858 (1968). In that case, the union picketed a 
builder and seller of houses advising that the cabinets being used in the houses were 
not made by union members, but failing to name the cabinetmaker at whom the 
pickets were directed. The Board found this activity to be a coercive attempt to get 
the builder to stop dealing with the cabinetmaker. 
26. NLRB v. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 
377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964). See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
27. In Laundry, Dry Cleaning &: Dye House Workers Intl. Union, Local 259, 
1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,i 21,328 (1967) the union picketed a restaurant that used a 
linen service supplied by a laundry with which the union was engaged in a dispute. 
The restaurant did not sell linen service to its customers, but merely used it in its 
operations. The Board found that there was not sufficient identification between the 
picketing and either a primary product or primary employer to render the picketing 
permissible as an attempt to persuade consumers not to buy a struck product. See also 
Twin Cities Carpenters Dist. Council & Boot & Shoe Workers, Local 527-C, AFL-CIO, 
167 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ,J 21,858 (1968). 
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Under the approach presented above, the Tree Fruits rationale 
might be stated as follows: consumer picketing which acts exclu-
sively on the demand for a struck product of the primary and which 
does not affect either any other part of the secondary's business or so 
much of his business as to be a threat to its continuance is not a 
secondary boycott for purposes of section 8(b)(4). If there are any 
coercive effects in such chain situations, they are merely incidental 
or insubstantial. On the other hand, in merger cases it is impossible 
to act exclusively on the demand for the primary's product without 
disturbing other business of the secondary. Therefore, in such 
situations the basic evil of the traditional secondary boycott-pres-
suring the secondary into a complete cessation of business with the 
primary-is likely to occur. It is this difference which suggests that 
the Tree Fruits exception should not be extended to merger cases. 
The principal case recognizes this approach. 
The court in the principal case suggested another possible test 
for determining the legality of consumer picketing. According to 
that test, the determination would tum on whether the union's 
picketing subjects the secondary employer to greater pressure or dis-
ruption than he would suffer from a successful strike against the 
primary.28 In the chain cases, assuming a successful strike against the 
primary, the unavailability of the primary's product because of that 
strike would have substantially the same effect as a successful appeal 
to consumers--the secondary would be unable to sell any of the 
struck product.29 In such cases, consumer picketing of the primary's 
product at the secondary's place of business should be allowed. 
On the other hand, in the "merger" cases, picketing the secondary 
would have a substantially greater effect on him than would a strike 
against the primary. On the facts of the principal case, for example, a 
successful strike against the newspaper would merely extinguish one 
source of advertising services and might therefore have little impact 
on the demand of the secondary' s customers for his meals. However, 
if the union were allowed to picket the advertised product, the 
secondary would be subjected to much greater pressure affecting 
his entire business. In the event of a strike, the secondary could 
merely change advertising outlets, while if picketed he would bear 
28. This test was suggested earlier by Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary 
Boycott, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 1363, 1412 (1962). Although Professor Lesnick's focus is 
limited to "common situs," "roving suits," and "reserved gate" problems, the distinc-
tion he suggests seems no less appropriate in determining when secondary picketing 
should constitute a violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii){B). Carried to its logical conclusion, 
however, this test would seem to permit consumer picketing in the total boycott situa-
tion when the secondary sells only the struck product (the "one product" case). This 
demonstrates the weakness of the suggested test and indicates that the "merger" theory 
would be preferable. 
29. Of course, he might get a similar product elsewhere and, therefore, lose nothing. 
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a considerable risk of losing business. Accordingly, in merger cases 
consumer picketing of the secondary should be disallowed. 
The result in the principal case can be supported on several 
grounds, as discussed above. It is suggested that the merger-chain 
analysis is preferable since it eliminates automatically any need to 
consider the application of Tree Fruits once the merger label is 
attached. But, helpful as this categorization is, it is not a panacea 
for solving the problems of determining when consumer picketing 
violates section 8(b)(4). As chain cases approach the one product 
situation, a difficult line-drawing task awaits the Board and the 
courts. 
